The Satanic Virtues of Morality

In agreement with Frederick Edwords, a principle of any system must start off with a clear understanding of what unites all people of that principle, versus what is considered to be more superfluous. The way that I akin it is that a philosophy is primarily closed, but also open within reason. The floodgates of thought are to be opened, but they need not drown the crops. Whenever an idea is to radical to be considered of the "same origin", it needs to change to a new definition. Also, just because I happen to like a quote and put it here doesn't mean I necessarily do or do not believe what it says. Rather, it's to expose people to the variety of ideas that people have on morality.

Let me first identify a problem which irks me to the umpteenth degree in Ethics and philosophy. Instead of figuring out how to deal with problems which we are facing right here and now, the trend in Ethics and philosophy is to keep inventing more and more abstract mathematical equations to try and "top" another system of Ethics. I would rather not waste my time here by showing you how ridiculous some questions of ethical concerns are, though look for the special red star * when I do show one of them. It basically starts reminding me of science novels. Instead of concentrating on actual science and empirical observations, the trend is to see who can write the wittiest, most outrageous, and speculative work. This is, of course, the anti-thesis to actual science, much like seeing who can invent the most speculative and abstract moral dilemma is the anti-thesis to philosophy. What happens is what Nietzsche talked about:

Another good philosopher, Edward Tivnav, writes in "The Moral Imagination: Confronting the Ethical Issues of Our Day", p. 12, that:

The book is specifically talking about abortion, an issue I'll address in a minute, and it implies to a discussion I had with a fellow Satanist. (Though he found my views too controversial on the subject of abortion apparently, and said he was renouncing Satanism.) We were discussing abortion, and I pointed out his reasons why he opposed abortion were very flimsy. He even agreed with me that his reasons for opposing abortion were flimsy, but he still, even then, refused to think of abortion as a legitimate idea.

I suppose I can make a case for the "germination" theory, or that it is very doubtful that you can change someone's ideas immediately, rather, it is only through independant contemplation by the person themselves that their idea may be changed. For instance, one may look to Robert Price, formerly a devout Christian, now a devout atheist who believes Jesus Christ was a non-historical figure, the very farthest end away from a devout Christian! I seriously doubt that Price one day picked up a Wells book and decided that he was right, instantly renouncing Christianity. More than likely, Price ruminated over the theory for a long time before he came to the conclusion.

Thus, in presenting my arguments, I may not be able to cause a draconian change in someone's thoughts, but I may leave an imprint on them for future times. The people who are going to agree with me either already agreed with me before reading my ideas, or else they never considered my point of view and now believe they are legitimate. However, it's very unlikely that I can sway someone's opinion who believes different than me. Einstein once remarked that, "It's harder to smash prejudices than atoms".

First, let's get a clear perspective on what are the current theories for morality. I will greatly condensce and necessarily over-simplify the process because of this consideration.

Let me also expound that I am not agreeing with post-modern deconstructionalism. (Also known as "moral skepticism", but actually implies belonging into a deeper school, which states that there is no underlying truth to logic, so whatever we write or say is neither true nor untrue.) A good counter of this is provided by Alan Sokal, in a speech given at New York University on October 30, 1996. (I'm rephrasing his argument a little bit).

Along similar lines, the philosopher of science Larry Laudan observed caustically that:

However, we should distinguish between claims of truth, and actual truth. Bruce Robbins' article in the September/October 1996 Tikkun magazine. His claim isn't very strong, but it'll get the general point across.

I'm willing to bet he's not from the camp of "The truth shall set you free." However, how can anyone be oppressed by the truth? Truth simply is, though this does get onto the interesting Eusebius perspective of whether or not it is good to lie for a cause, (also an underlying Kantian "aim is what matters" form of logic implied there, or perhaps consequentialism that the end result is the greater good?), and how the truth can hurt. Can the truth hurt? I suppose if you tell someone their fat their feelings will get hurt, but without identifying a problem it will never be fixed, (see later arguments), so I conclude on a fortiori principles that the truth is good. Robbins doesn't agree with me. In explaining the problem he says that:

Hopefully though, he's not claiming that is the truth. Claiming science, (which is now it's own sub-category of pseudo-science), and actually being science are two different things. Other scientific evidence countered this viewpoint, thus science triumphed in showing the real truth. (In particular, check out Jared Diamond's book, "Guns, Germs, and Steel", for a complete breakthrough in discrediting the idea). What this means is that we should examine the evidence, based upon our principles of what logic and reason is, and reject any assertion which does not fit the criteria for establishing reliable empirical evidence.

What I am trying to do is the exact opposite of "moral nihilism", and am trying to do what the hermeneutic philosopher Charles Taylor suggested. Ultimately, meanings, interpretations, and various ways of being are ultimately rooted in a particular moral outlook. This moral outlook, or "inescapable framework," as Taylor calls it, gives substance, credence, intelligibility, and a sense of conviction to the individual's beliefs, commitments, and actions. He suggests that "to think, feel, judge within such a framework is to function with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is incomparably higher than the others which are more readily available to us." ("Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity").

If we wonder too far to the extreme side of skepticism, we find the warning of Robert MacIve:

You may notice that many of these sound very familiar to each other. For instance, ethics of conscience is generally formed by religion. This is because it is a much more ontological perspective than an objective one. There are endless ways you can look at these forms of ethics. For instance, on the Ethics of Virtue, you can make this a social viewpoint, (virtuous as society tells you), individualistic virtue, theological virtue, etc. The trend within ethics has been to disregard one point of view, and to maintain what looks like exclusionist camps. That is to say that you must believe "X", anything outside of "X" is bad, you're not one of them.

In a way, it reminds me of martial arts a few years back, and even still today. In martial arts, you'll find people selling their newest super-WOW program, guaranteed in seven days or less to make you the ultimate fighting machine. The truth is that their usually lying, but, they'll generally emphasize something like how to kick like a mule. With just one devastating kick, you can knock someone out. Then the next program will come out and say, "No, you need to learn how to wrestle! Don't you know that 90% of fights go to the ground? You can't kick on the ground!!" Then all the groups spend their time bickering and in-fighting so much that it wasn't until the Ultimate Fighting Championship came out that people realized that the winners were people who could kick, punch, grapple, and trap. All systems had their weak points and their strong points, the way to learn how to effectively fight was to learn how to utilize all systems into one harmonious package, not be the king of punches or the next Superfoot.

Likewise, all philosophical arguments have their weak points and their strong points. Some moral arguments, such as ones that use algorithms, really don't impress me. The basic premise behind philosophers who make ultra-elaborate articles remind me rather faintly of the "Flat-Earth" society. They were a group of people who believed that the Bible prescribes a flat-Earth, and they went about proving it. They would go through nautical journals and found information about whenever a boat would see a lighthouse that would be too far away if the World was circular. They published it in a fairly lengthy book. The problem was that they took about 1.5% of the information in the journals and ignored the 98.5% which contradicted their findings. 98.5% of the material showed that the boats should have seen the lighthouses much further off than they did if the Earth was flat. Likewise, abstract philosophical arguments are aimed at the 1.5% minority while ignoring the 98.5% that will be dealt with on a regular basis. (Actually the World isn't a sphere, it's elliptical, in case anyone feels pedantic enough to point that out.)

Thus instead of quibbling about what "school" of philosophy we belong to, and instead of wondering what really cool abstract argument we can come up with, we should focus on creating the best argument for morality and ethics, and focus on the most common situations that will be faced.

The definition of morality is what causes a considerable degree of interest. Morality comes into play whenever people interact with each other. Thus, morality is a system of shared values which justify an action or actions. Morality then becomes how to decide on the best course of action in a given situation. Conflict arises whenever there isn't an agreement on a shared value.

Sometimes though, it isn't just conflict over a shared value. For instance, an example is given below on the difference between the Eastern and Western idea of truth-telling. Both agree that you should tell the truth, however, the East values harmony over truthtelling, thus to be in harmony with your surroundings takes greater precedence over telling the truth, while the Western perspective is considerably different. The conflict can arise over which is the greater shared value.

A question will then pop up. "What's the difference between ethics and morality?" To the average person, there is no distinction. Easiest way to put a distinction between the two is to employ the term "ethics" only in a work-bounded context and the term "morality" in the context of the activity of living one's life. For instance, here's one example. When I took my CPR certification, a technique for forcefully removing an object lodged in the throat was no longer used. (It was to be employed when someone was unconscious or had sustained an injury where getting them up was not practical).

The teacher told me that this technique was highly effective, and that the lack of a replacement for it is bizarre. She showed me the technique anyway, and was asking for a review about the technique with AHA. Here's the distinction. If someone is choking, they have something lodged in their throat, and are unconscious, I am ethically bound to sit there and let them die. If I use the technique and they die, I will be asked if I performed the maneuver as I was trained to do it. The answer is "NO", I knew I was not supposed to do that technique, yet I did anyway. That means that I am no longer covered under the "Good Samaritan" Act. Morally, however, I might find it too opprobrious to just sit around and let someone die. Thus I am caught between an ethical dilemma and a moral one.

This is the reason why ethics and morality are not one and the same. Ethics are formulated because any group needs to have unifying principles by which they strive together to achieve. Ethics thus became a way of unifying a line of work, medicine, law, business, etc. This provides a context of some organized, productive social activity. Ethics are also found in "work" areas such as sports.

The problem is though that many philosophers saw no distinction between the two things. In "Methods of Ethics", by Henry Sidgwick, he states that:

However, there is now an easy and workable definition, so I think this position needs to be adopted for distinction. Some others, such as Paul Jersild, state that ethics is the study of morality, while morality is the actual behaviour itself. This definition might work somewhat, but that pushes ethics more in line with philosophy than with morality.

The next portion that comes into this is the moral theory. The moral theory seeks to introduce a degree of rationality and rigour into our moral deliberations. That is to say that our morals must be justified by some form of reasoning, they won't be accepted if they are based upon poor reasoning or inaccurate facts. Particularly of interest to philosophers are what moral beliefs are self-contradictory or mutually exclusive to another one.

However, moral conundrums are not formulated by "right versus wrong". They are focused on "right versus right". For instance, consider these common conundrums in morality, (This is taken from "How Good People Make Tough Choices: Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living", by Rushworth Kidder, p. 16).

He goes on to say that it is ridiculous to assume the world works on a basis that: "On the one hand is the good, the right, the true, and noble. On the other hand is the awful, the wicked, the false, and the base. And here I stand, equally attracted to each." Decisions where it is "right versus wrong" are very easy to make, decisions where it is "right versus right" are not.

The way that Václav Havel, (Summer Meditations), desribes the importance of shared moral values is ". . . without commonly shared and widely entrenched moral values and obligations, neither the law, nor democratic government, nor even the market economy will function properly." Niebuhr, (The Responsible Self, p. 89), puts it as that we live "less under universal law and less in pursuit of a universal ideal than a life of responsibility in universal community". That is to say that we recognize that we each have different goals, differents ideals and ideas, yet we must find a way to get along equally with each other.

The questions we then come across is that what are our shared values, whom are they shared by, why should we share these values, and how does that effect us? These are the questions I will attempt to answer in later dissertions.

Outside of that, the first question we will address is, "Is morality an absolute or relative thing?" It is relative. Now the Christians, Islams, and other religious groups shriek in horror. “But!” they cry, “if it is relative, we cannot punish child murderers, rapists, etc.” That is 100% wrong, and any Christian or other person who says that doesn’t know the first thing about moral relativity. Let me ask you a question. Is it okay to kill? Yes, no? Sometimes? Was it okay for the Allied nations to kill the Japanese during WWII?

We then move from an absolute statement to a more vague statement which is that: “Murder is unjust killing.”

This is, of course, an answer which is begging the question. When it is it just and unjust? The law tells us that if a man breaks into your home, with a weapon, and tries to run away, you cannot shoot him in the back. That is unjust. If he is facing towards you, that is just. If he falls down and you shoot him, unjust. If he is standing, just. How relative is that? The Bible, at least, gives us some indications of a moral relative standpoint. One of them is that if a burglar breaks in during the daytime to feed, then give him more than what he came for and send him away. However, you could kill him if he broke in during nightime, because you didn't know what his intentions were. Thus the Bible seems to be implying that intent, rather than solely the action, is the basis for punishment.

How about killing animals? We only need a small amount for iron, (heme sources of iron absorb 3x better than non-heme, or non-animal sources), and certainly not the extraordinaire amounts of animal products we eat today. Is that a just or unjust killing? How about Euthanasia? Is this a just or unjust killing? Is it okay to kill a dog on the street? Is it okay for euthanasia on animals? Is euthanasia okay on humans? Yes or no? The invariable answer would be that it depends on the situation, or, in fact, relative. Let me explain the differences between relative and absolute.

We say the law of gravity is absolute. You cannot escape it. What comes up, must come down. To prove this idea, take a baseball and throw it in the air. If it comes back down, pick it up, and throw it again. Repeat until fully convinced the ball will always come back down. Now, relative on the other hand, means it varies upon situation. If one bowling ball weighs two pounds, another weighs 10 pounds, and you drop them from the same height, they will always hit the ground at the same time. That is absolute. The only thing that would be needed to break this as an absolute rule would be if you threw a baseball in the air and it stayed there infinity. Or if you dropped a ten pound ball and a two pound ball and one hit the ground before the other.

Now, what is relative? Whether or not a baseball will travel fifty feet when you throw it, is relative. It may or may not happen. This is where society screws up so horribly. We drill ethical codes into our kids, “Thou shalt not kill, steal, etc.”, but then they get out and realize the real world doesn’t work that way. The real world applauds the products, not the ethical matters of how you achieve them.

Why is this even important? Because one of the major factors in criminals is not having an established frame of reference for morality. You see, if you have two seperate ideologies for behaviour on what is right and wrong, the child or human will get confused and reject them both. If you tell a kid that "cheating never prospers", and then he reads that George Bush is President of the United States by cheating an election, the kid won't understand it. Roy Baumeister’s work in his article of "Violent Pride" in the April, 2001 issue of the "Scientific American", and his paradigm breaking book "Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty", are very enlightening in this matter. One reviewer of his work, Marianna Scheffer, teaches incarcerated criminals. Before reading his work, she was taught the standard, that criminals were the results of low self-esteem. However, this was flatly contradicted by what she saw. Criminals instead seemed to possess extraordinarily high opinions of themselves. Perpetrators of violent crime combine a high but brittle self esteem, with poor self regulation.

The lack of self-regulation comes from contradictory statements heard throughout their lives. They don't have a solid foundation for building anything upon, which leads to violent or anti-social behaviour patterns. This is what strikes me as the oddity in legitimate schools of mystery. They tell us that we should sacrifice the individual idealism for the group idealism at a later stage. I view it as the opposite. I think that the group principles should be stressed in the beginning, and as a greater move towards Gnosis is attained, the person should be given more individual freedom in deciding values.

The Nazi's, the Assyrians, Bin Ladin, et al., none of them EVER think they are the criminals, they think they are the victims. The Nazi's were protesting the unfair restrictions applied on Germany after WWI, the Assyrians believed they were uniting the World, "Out of one mouth", as they put it, and Bin Ladin thinks that the "Western Devil", has been oppresing his people and turning it secular. The Black Panthers, the Klu Klux Klan, Neo-Nazi's, street gangs, wherever you look, they are the victim. In order to be the victim, someone has to be dehumanized, as per David Grossman's, "On Killing". The easiest way to become dehumanized according to Baumeister is to join a group where the individual ideology is sacrificed to a "higher" cause.

In some senses, this irks people because it reaffirms Anatole France's ironic conclusion, "morality is the sum of the prejudices of a community". Anacharsis made another demonstration of this to his fellow Greeks, where he told them that if he were to gather every group and have them tell what their customs were considered sacred, and that these customs could be taken away if considered immoral by even one other group in the area, then there would be nothing left which would be sacred. Though somewhat interesting, neither denied social order was necessary, only that because of the wide range of differences in what social order constituted, it was imprudent for one civilization to force another to fit its ideas.

In order to find a convienant way out of a moral conundrum, the most often relied upon thing to do is to find an outside factor which can independantly verify an ideology, or quite simply, a "mob mentality". This happens for all major religions, and even some independant forms of morality such as Ayn Rand's objectivism, Fredrick Nietzsche's "Nihilism", etc. Instead of emphasizing how to morally rationalize, we instead chose to give moral dictates. Dictated logic, is of course, not logic at all.

So, to begin this dissertion on morality from a Satanic viewpoint, I will talk about the major tenants of it. Note here that whenever I say, "Satanists", I really mean, "a large group of Satanists". Instead of bordering on tautology by repeating that phrase, I stick to the more dramatic, though erroneous, "the Satanist".

The antithesis to this is "Primacy of Consciousness". I will be necessarily brief in all these areas, perhaps one day I will publish a full volume on it. The most basic tenant of this is that, "We are here, and it doesn't matter why we are here". Yes, many a philosopher struggled with this question, but the answers have thus far been fruitless. The best answer the Bible and the Qur'an could up with was, "To worship a metaphysical being until we died, and then, we would be rewarded by this being". Of course, that's mere speculation.

Even Satanists who believe in the existence of other metaphysical beings do not worship them. They still believe that it is our actions while we are here on Earth which ultimately determine our ability to 'be' something, not how much we can masochistically sacrifice to a higher being. Most forms of "knowledge" that we acquire are either a priori or a posteriori. Since there is no way that we can identify where the origins of life began, if someone/thing created them, or if someone/thing did create them, it did so with a specific purpose, we can safely say that the most important thing to concentrate on is the fact that we're here.

Some people, however, use their explanation of how morality or consciousness formed as a means to justify their line of reasoning. For instance, Nietzsche looked into the origins of human morality, and did so by eliminating all forms of authority and reverence. What he found was that morality was just a code of morals that were based upon a system of customs. These laws and ideas had their origins in an instinct, one for survival, (typically of an elite group), which best served their own welfare. For instance, he found that by comparing the morality of the Egyptians and the morality of the Goths, that both were based upon the environment, the climate, food supply, the people who surrounded them, etc. Nietzsche then found that the best way to dominate the unsuspecting people was to put the words into the mouth of God, thus giving them the substantial authority.

The big problem that Nietzsche found was that this caused rules which were formulated to fit a temporary need to become a divine commandment, which was carried on past the stage where it was once useful. Therefore, Nietzsche concluded that the chief idea of a moral system was to continue its existence, and destroy anyone who denied it or questioned it. Eventually though, this false system could not meet the current demands of the new society, whose new standards would destroy the system, causing his "Nihilism".

A theist might tell me that I was created by God, and that the laws of man are written on his heart:

Thus this would become an argument of conscience for the idea of morality. However, as I argue below, this is untenable based upon proof we have from other research. Nietzsche might have made a better example using Hammurabi's code handed down by Shamash, the same way that Moses had it handed down from YHVH. The Mosaic laws were obviously based upon Hammurabi's earlier codes, only that the Mosaic law was kinder. That's because when they were formulated. In Hammurabi's time, everything revolved around irrigation. Thus the laws were meant to be strict upon anyone who messed that up. However, the laws of Moses were based on a time where they had made early contact with the Persians, and times were not so hard. Thus while still using the same mythos and laws, they had no need for the harsh regulation of Hammurabi's time. The situation changed, and so did the laws.

What I see is what I get. Sounds strange doesn't it, but for a very long time, and even still today in mysticism circles, the belief that "what I see is really an elaborate delusion" is commonplace. The idea basically worked on the premise that if I saw something, it being interpretated by my brain. How do I know my reality is someone else's reality? You basically end up in a remake of "The Matrix" where "There is no spoon". I only think a spoon exists, a priori, a spoon does not exist. Of course, I think this argument can be effectively squashed by having someone close their eyes and walk into a wall. Without there being external sense-data deriviation of seeing the wall there, (to equate "I'm going to hit a wall, therefore, I should now feel pain"), it can be concluded that the wall does, in fact, exist.

The second faulty piece of logic is that like things behave like. Or perhaps the saying, "If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, then it is a..." In other words, were we really to be living in the "Matrix" setting, like in the movie, certain events would happen that would be "non-like". For instance, having a camel carry on a conversation with you, or having a tire iron hit you in the head in the middle of a desert, etc. The point of non-perceptional realities are to create a futile search for some assurance that the things you think are real aren't delusions, fantasies, or elaborate hoaxes. Great for paranoid people though.

There is, of course, another form of this delusion. Most people will recognize it as coming from the Platonic school of philosophy. For those unaware, I'll give a very brief, abrupted, and somewhat convulted view of it. The Platonic school of philosophy believes that we should equate the infinite, transcendent, or "Good" with the word "God". This "Good God" thing is exemplar of all things which are good, and so only things of finite value which are intristically good are of God. They must resemble the deity in respect to a property that the God has, such as being beautiful, knowledgeable, or compassionate. (The list goes on much further). Now, any thing which is not of the "Good God" is a bad thing, and must therefore be disregarded on an a priori basis. This is the basic assumption of the "God versus Devil" mentality, which I do not pretend to tolerate. However, I do, at least, believe this to be a somewhat good ideal on the archetypical level, (for instance, Satan, Lucifer, Apollo, Ma, Dionysus, etc.), but I do not believe it in the Neo-Platonic sense of the word.

Robert Adams, "Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics" is one of the newest books which is arguing for this type of principle. He doesn't so much try to convince us in the existence or nature of God so much as levels of excellence. These levels are aspects of a divine nature, and of this aspect, we can only have "fragmentary glimpses"(p. 51) and thatwe, and other valuablethings, can resemble onlyin the most distantand approximate of ways(p. 17). Just like Dennis Prager's statement: "…belief in God and acting ethically must be inextricably linked…God demands right behavior more than anything else, including right ritual and right belief."

Like all theists do, he argues that without a conceptual frameword of "God", then no systems of ethics are useable. That is to say, that all other forms of ethical arguments are merely based upon a fictional principle rather than a grounded one. It's an echo of C. S. Lewis, "The Case for Christianity":

However, I don't believe this to be the case. Since appeals to God have justified everything from female mistreatment, mistreatement of natives in foreign countries, wars, terrorist bombings, etc., I think that arguing that someone possesses an intristic knowledge of the "Good God" is a false perspective. Either of them could have been rewritten to say that: "Moral Laws are meaningless if aliens didn't create us. Without aliens to justify our existence, to have something made up not by ourselves, but by greater intelligence, is the only way we can have a real moral law."

It's a problem with the recognition that what is good for one person is bad for another. One Orientalist who realized this was Lammens. In arguing for a strong use of the Hadith as a means of reliable transmission of the authority and existence of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslims argue that there are passages which give unflattering reference to Muhammad. However, Lammens acknowledges that you cannot judge right or wrong from a modern European perspective, something opprobrious to an European might have been highly regarded by the early pious Muslims.

Thus we come to a problem. Adams wants us to root a definition which is ethereal upon another definition which is ethereal. This, of course, leads no room for an objective viewpoint, since both views are as varied as the shape of snowflakes. Adams does, at least, make some considerable arguments. Namely that we cannot just take an impersonal viewpoint on the nature of "Good", because some good things have a special value to people who have a relation to them. * For instance, if we have one good person, valued by friends, relatives, employer, children, etc., and we are offered, "What if we can make him into two good people?" do we take it? The obvious answer would be, "Of course", but the trade-off is that the neither of the two good persons will be the same ones that the friends, relatives, etc. knew, it will be two equally good men, as good as the original, but now bearing no relation to the first, we can that what actually happened was a loss because the people involved lost something which had a special relation to them.

Adams makes an argument against utilitarian altruism, that is to say, doing the maximum amount of good, (aggregation), to the maximum amount of people. He believes that being "good" should be on its own merit, instead of trying to be "supergood", (I use quotations of my own free will, when I actually am quoting him, I'll give a reference page), and that of its own merit, regardless of whether or not it has long-standing consequences, it should be respected for its own sake.

His next argument is that of one for truthfulness. In an aggregated viewpoint, the idea is to get the maximum amount of "good" done. Thus, it would be "good" to tell the truth, until you can lie and cause a "greater good". However, even if we accept this as a good argument, I can think of one disproving one in real life. As per Richard Carrier's look into Eusebius, Eusebius admits that he believes it is good and fitting to use a lie to further push the cause of the Church. Now, Eusebius' work is looked at as being blatantly forged in places, and the defense of J. B. Lightfoot that Eusebius was just naive' fails in application of modern historiography methods. The main reason for this look into Eusebius was unargueably because of his statement that he believed he should lie to promote a "further good". Another point of contention, at least raised by me, is I value the individual above the society. That is to say that if you lie, even for a greater good, you run the consequence of having your word damaged. Jesus did have the right idea when he said, "Let your yes mean yes, and no mean no". (Mathew 5:37).

Where Adams really starts slipping up is in Chapters 10 and 11. Adams argues that the commandments given by God should be followed, and that should be our basis for morality. This is, of course, begging the question. Do we still stone our daughters for not having "tokens of their virginity" on their wedding night? Do we still believe that a rebellious child is as witchcraft, so hey, grab those stones and start chucking them. He does, at least, agree with theMillian idea that ourobligations are determined bythe rules our societywould do well toenforce via (legal orother) sanctions. Unfortunately though, despite some well thought arguments, the theocratic argument still fails. Even Christian authors such as Abraham Heschel, realize that there is some fruitlessness in trying to use a theocratic system of morals, though he, of course, doesn't quite blame the system itself, rather on humans inability to perceive the system. The way he puts it is: "To try to distill the Bible, which is bursting with life, drama, and tension, to a series of principles would be like trying to reduce a living person to a diagram." ("God in Search of Man", p. 20)

I believe that is the "method of science, the aim of religion". I do accept Kant's theories that the human sciencesof history and anthropologycan be of greathelp in developing a clear outline for ethics. Kant believed the empirical studyof humans might provideus with evidence of moral progress. (I won't comment on what I think of some of Kant's other theories). Let's start looking at this and see where it takes us.

This is actually a combination of beliefs, which will be discussed here. The first one is "Rational Egoism". Egoism says that the primary goal of human morality is to look out for number one. Ask anyone who has gone through leukemia therapy or been in jail. Friends and relatives start dropping out real soon. In the end, the only person that cares about you is you. Christians themselves reaffirm this when they say, "Jesus loves you", because the understood statement is, "If no one else loves you, Jesus does".

As noted earlier, the easiest way to get out of this is to create a gang mentality, or a group of like-minded people. In this case, the virtues of individualism must be given up to the group, and can never be reclaimed from the group. The second part of that statement is important for future discussion purposes.

The next portion of this is that there is only "responsibility to the responsible". This rejects the theory of altruism, that the most noble of actions are those that benefit others by means of the sacrifice of one's own values. Let's look at some examples. You may think it is morally good to give money to a homeless man, but what if he spends it on drugs? You can't lay much of a moral claim to having done good there. Or as another example, the one that lawyers often use. They protect the rights of their clients. However, after protecting the rights of their clients, their clients commit another crime which violates someone else's rights. Actions intended to benefit others may well be simply benevolent, or expressions of compassion or charity, however, you can't tell whether an action is good or evil just by looking at who benefits from it, and how much of it is expiatory.

However, this is also a rejection of predation, which is that actions are taken to benefit you by means of the sacrifice of others to yourself. Whenever this approach is taken, a development of becoming a social pariah takes place. Mike Tyson may be considered the ultimate embodiment of this philosophy. His statement, "Nobody ever objected before" fits very well. Now, he's seen as an outcast and a joke by most people, going from once being the king of boxing. In essense, there are no free rides. If you expect to take what you can from everyone, you will one day pay for those takings, and someone will collect. The books and videos of Marc MacYoung are excellent on learning what really happens to people who live by the principles of predation.

Now, this is only a partial confirmation of psychological egoism. Even when we obey by societies laws we do so because it is what benefits us. Eventually, we start learning that if we do what society wants, we enjoy greater benefits. However, there are acts which are done purely for psychological moral standards, such as someone who reports criminal activities without monitary compensation while risking their own safety. However, let it also be known that there's a reason that crimestoppers pays cash. When underlying motives are the primary evidence for a theory, it moves beyond the possibility of empirical verification and the possibility of empirical negation (since motives are private), and therefore it becomes a closed theory. A closed theory is a theory that rejects competing theories on its own terms and is non-verifiable and non-falsifiable. Equally though, we must reject ethical altruism on the same basis.

Noted philosopher David Hume offers us six responses against psychological egoism, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (Appendix II-Of Self Love), so I'll deal with them here:

Yes, but love, friendship, and compassion are soon gone once someone lands in jail or is in the hospital for major reasons. These motives are most commonly seen when there is a benefit to them, and are almost never seen when it's a detriment to the person. However, we can take note that there are some small cases where this does happen. Since disproving an absolute statement only needs one contradictory example, this will suffice.

Disagreed. In societies such as lion's heirarchy, sons that are not of his own fruit are killed by the alpha male. This is hardly an act of compassion. The Lion does whatever is necessary to maintain his own social predominance. However, though there is a "pecking order", they do work together, but it is for the value of a singular cause. That being the necessity of existence. A "lone wolf" doesn't live very long.

Disagreed, at least partly. You wish someone well when you like them, (a vested interest, to be sure), however, do we wish people who we absolutely hate to do well? We might say, "I wish you well", but like the words, "I love you", the meaning underlying them is obscured, and that renders this to be a closed theory. If "I love you" is the single most altruistic expression known to humankind, then why is it that a 1976 through 1987 analysis by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports concluded that twice as many women are killed by their husband than by strangers?

Why is it then, that domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women between ages 15 and 44 in the united States - more than car accidents, muggings, and rapes combined. (Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1991) In other words, just because altruistic expressions are being used doesn't guarantee an underlying motive to be certain. This is, of course, another closed theory on both sides.

I would assume then that Hume's definition of self-interest is now actually "Self-preservation". In this sense, I would agree with him. However, acting in manner's that are detrimental to long-term health such as vengeance, is still a form of self-interest. You're getting revenge for something that happened to you. Likewise, vanity and fame are still self-interest forms, though they may not be the key to self-preservation.

In other words, people would rather be known as humane than viscious. I would still argue that being labeled "viscious" is a form of being socially ostracized, which is, of course, opprobrious for self-interest.

The underlying thought here would be that I'd concur with Adler on his ideas on sex. Sex may be the primary drive behind human nature, but it is not the sole drive behind human nature. Likewise, egoism may be the primary thing by which human morality is based upon, but it cannot be considered the sole thing. Weak Rational Egoism is the preferred method for development, as there may be some cases where not acting in your own self-interest will be the most rational decision. If you think this is a contradiction, remember the saying that, "The feet you step on today, could be connected to the asses you have to kiss tomorrow".

This can be interpreted as cronyism, a generally political term, but in the realm of ethics, it's used to mean protecting certain people whom have a vested interest in you. I don't see anything wrong with it in particular. The objection that, "Unless a standard of ethics is applied equally to everyone, it negates its value" thus fails to show any true worth, because we do give different ethics to say, a mass murderer than to a pious judge. It's like saying that unless the bank gives a loan to everyone that asks for one, the value of it is negated. I'm really not worried if Charles Manson thinks that I'm considerate to him. I have no obligation, moral, ethical, or otherwise, to be kind to him, or to show him the same level of respect that I would show someone like Maasaki Hatsumi.

The definition of relativism is actually one which depends upon what type of relativism we are talking about. For the purposes of clarification, I will discuss them here. The most general definition is:

That definition is not entirely correct. For instance, it denies another type of relativism, one which is found in the laws of the United States and England, and that is "situational relativism". Situational relativism states that:

Thus absolutists face a conundrum in this sense that the laws we live by state that it is relative to the situation. The type of relativism which the first definition gives is actually more along the lines of a second type of relativism, which is called "normative relativism". This states that:

There are, of course, a couple of problems with this. The major one being that it doesn't allow us to criticize another culture. I find this one entertaining to the umpteenth degree. In other words, the best argument against social relativism is that, "Boo-hoo-hoo!! We can't complain about someone else's culture!"

However, among more serious deep-thinkers, there are, at least, some things which can be understood as real arguments. Namely, that being that it equates believing something to be right, with actually being right. This isn't necessarily true with social relativism, but it is true with individual relativism. While cultural relativism has room for criticizing or reformation, individual relativism does not. For cultural relativism, the question arises that, "What constitutes a culture?" The country, the state, the city, the neighborhood, bikers, the tattooed, the tatooers? What this line of questioning is ineviteably trying to do is degenerate the topic from "cultural relativism" to "individual relativism", because we can already see the problem with individual relativism. However, this line of questioning is easily deflected by the basic fact that we do NOT live under ONE autonymous authority figure, rather, we live under several. Laws vary from state to state in the United States. For example, whether or not it is legal to carry certain knives or weapons. The same thing applies for whenever you go to a bar, or any sort of cultural environment, you have now taken on following the rules of that establishment. If you don't follow them, you will be removed from that environment. Thus, cultural relativism does make sense, in that we are under numerous laws and rules, our own included. If you adopt a street gang as your culture, there are rules to follow, and not following them will put you into their version of justice.

The final form of relativism which is the most embraced form of relativism is called meta-ethical relativism. This states that:

It is this viewpoint of which I will present my strongest argument here, as that is the one I am most concerned with for the time being. Some people will claim that relativism is a self-refuting contradiction. In other words, by saying, "Everything is relative", I am making a non-relative statement. However, there are almost always exceptions to the rules, so while relativism may be the most commonly seen form of rationality, there are some things which are cross-cultural. (See bottom for a list of aesthetics that are shared by all cultures). Though most forms of physical appearance are not cross-referenceable through time/place, there are a few which almost all societies have shared. Thus, becoming like Rupert Sheldrake's theory of Morphic Resonance, these laws were probably shaped out of habit of human nature moreso than anything else.

(Emphasis added). In other words, what we should base morality on is de facto morality, or that what actually happens is the premise for morality, not ideal morality. The problem with ideal morality is that it too is as subjective as anything. Asking a thousand different people what the "ideal" moral climate is and you will receive a thousand different answers, hence, the ability to make a rational choice in morality is not able to be based on ideology.

One critic of this is Elements of Moral Philosophy by James Rachels. He says that there are a set of values which are ubiquitous to all cultures. These are

This is false. Infantcide has been practiced by virtually all cultures. More important than it being practiced was it being condoned.

Incorrect. This is as relative as anything else. For instance, Jewish Talmud and Old Testament, along with the Qur'an and Hadith of the Islamic tradition, tell us that we may be truthful to people of the same religion, but we may be as dishonest as we please with foreigners and those outside of the faith. This is also inconsistent with a moral absolute postulation. Remember that in order for something to be absolute, there must be no contradictory examples.

False again. In the Pre-Islamic tribes of Arabia, if a man was killed by another one of a seperate tribe, an act of vengeance was necessary against the tribe. It didn't matter who was killed, so long as they were from another tribe. This wasn't done as a matter of justice, it was done to show how strong the tribe was. If a tribe did not repay, "An eye for an eye", neighboring tribes would assume they were weak, and they would attack that tribe. Since this obviously has no implications morally, rather than just for pure survival, it cannot be a condoned killing on the principles of morality. High morals, of course, are a leisure of a less harsh lifestyle.

Noting this problem, some philosophers such as Larry Colero try to side-step the problem:

The emphasis is mine, but effectively, he's stating that there's some looming underlying principle, which is obscured by values and virtues. If you nod your head agreeing with that statement, read it again, and think about what it's saying. There is an underlying principle, but it's changed by cultural/individual values and virtues. I'd have to say that sounds very relative to me. So why the circular reasoning perspective? Let's then look to something else. Russian soldiers, (during the Communist period), were purposely starved, though food was around. They were thus taught to steal it. They were not punished for stealing. They were punished for getting caught. Lying, treachery, deceitfulness, they were all refined to a high degree. You could argue that the Russian military was not a society, but given their size and self-containment, I think they were. What they based this upon was consequentialism, they believed an effective soldier should be able to fight dirty, thus they instilled methods where this is what would happen. However, most other societies have deemed it that being nefarious is not conducive to a good society.

In other words, the conclusion is dangerous because it makes us think that there's nothing universal about morality. I wish he had a stronger objection than that, but he doesn't. He's saying that it reduces morality to something that is done by:

I'd have to say that if someone can live in a manner which fits all those successfully, they are a very moral person indeed. The objections for the universal principles are based on consequentialism, apparently unknown to most people. Perhaps quoting a Greek orator, by the name of Demosthenes, will help:

It is, in fact, so much noted that believers need a God in order to find a reason to live that it is probably what I consider to be one of the most important assets of religion. However, even the belief in God does not satisfy an answer to why we live.

In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein considers God to be something we call "the meaning of life". Although God is not a personal being, Wittgenstein thinks it is convenient for us to anthropomorphize the concept of God into a father figure, and when we pray to God, we contemplate the meaning of life. (This is interesting to me in a sense because the newest trend has been to anthropomorphize a deity into a mother.)

Insomuch as anything, this is an exercise in futility. When asked to tell "what is God?", the answer will be, "Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Omnipresent". Since humans are limited by the finite, measuring in the infinite is an exercise in futility. Though, to be sure, having an unquantifiable God will make a great opportunity to sell lots of books. Thus Wittgenstein and others have pulled themselves into a cul-de-sac. Since we cannot know the meaning of life, having God, (which we cannot understand), as the answer to the meaning of life, (which we cannot understand) is just an exercise in circular thinking.

Thus we would have to affirm something solid and concrete for this existense, otherwise, we have something which is based upon the objectional, (living, breathing, moving), upon something which is based on the metaphysical and thus non-objectional.

The purpose in a Satanic lifestyle is to fulfill responsibility to the responsible. To do the best at the job so that they receive the most benefits, being responsible to the job and to the employer which takes care of him/her. To be responsible to the children who will bring him/her pride in the future and probably take care of him/her as well. To be responsible to the spouse whose love is needed. Most importantly, to be responsible to themselves, because without their existence, no other people could be co-dependant.

Thus Satanists do place a lot of trust in people, however, only very select people. Emotions are not to be wasted on those not worth worthy of them in the first place. By this principle, the amount of consideration dictated towards another individual is grown proportionally. The less time I spend worrying about what the secretary thinks about me, the more time I can spend focused on the job. The less time I spend worrying about a "fair-weather friend", the more I can enjoy time with a lifelong friend. However, it does extend beyond that.

From a theistic standpoint, life doesn't make much sense. Freud wrote aptly (though in another context) in The Future of an Illusion:

In other words, we face the same situation that Emil Fackenheim did. "God’s ways are unintelligible, not that there are no ways of God. . . . God was even more inscrutable than had hitherto been thought, and His revelations even more ambiguous and intermittent" (quoted in Paul Edwards, 1973, p. 395).

If we cannot rationably or reasonably understand how God works, "for the Lord works in mysterious ways", then how should it be that we should base something empirical upon it? It was Socrates who permitted us to realize that if a religious creed is to yield any specific moral prescriptions at all, the ethics must be extraneously imported or tacked on to theism on extra-theological, worldly grounds, being put into the mouth of God by the clergy when asserting His goodness or omnibenevolence. Likewise then, if extra-theological elements must be tacked onto theology, then it, in and of itself, is not complete. One example used is the orange analogy. That is to say, that if we lived in a "perfect paradise", we would only eat oranges, and not apples. However, one day, we would come across apples, and say that, "Apples are about the same roundness and size of oranges. Therefore, we should try an apple and see if it tastes good too." The eating of apples is not necessary to survival, but it is so in a sense, because without pleasure in existence, what is the point of surviving in the first place? Thus we do what Korsgaard describes as:

The point behind living exceeds beyond mere responsibilities, however. From the first time we realized that our life is worth living, we gain incite that what we do with our life, what we make of it, how we enjoy it, can never be taken away. "Love is the Law, Love under Will". No matter what anyone says, the joy of life is the joy of love. Love of learning, love of doing, love of others, love of ideals, love of country or cause, anything, everything, is the foundation of meaning. A thousand lifetimes would be meaningless without it. As Epicurus wrote:

Richard Carrier summarized it best: "A healthy mind in a healthy body, pursuing and manifesting what it loves, is the meaning of life." Some also may find enjoyment in the pursuit of things which are beyond them. The philosopher William James once said, "The great use of life is to spend it for something that will outlast it."

Satanists hold that all human beings are responsible for their own actions. Thus we reject many forms of moral and ethical ideas which state that humans are the sole product of an environment, and are thus not responsible for their own actions. Satanists hold that everyone should be and is responsible for what they do, and they should be expected to answer for all consequences, good or bad. Even if the person is a "victim" of their social upbringing, they should take the responsibility to evolve themselves beyond that point, or, if they know they are too lazy to try to rehabilitate themselves, and are a danger to the people around them, including loved ones, they should do the honorable thing and commit suicide. If more of the right people were committing suicide, homicide wouldn't even be an issue.

A hyperbole? To be sure, yes it is, but even within the great exaggeration, there are elements of truth.

Since Satanism is principle in dealing with the joys of life, death is considered a sad occasion, on the pricinple that "death is the great abyss". At the same time, it's not particularly a bad occasion for the person themselves, as they no longer exist. Without a point of existence from which to speak, death is irrelevant. The primary reason for this sadness is because the person cannot maintain their responsibilities to their peers, to their family, to their friends, and to themselves. However, we do recognize that in certain mental and physical states, it is impossible to do this while living, and the abyss of death is better than the torment of life. Therefore, an individual has the full right to die with dignity, to die by euthanasia, and the right to suicide.

Let me speak a little further on this issue. There are now two camps on this issue, those being passive and active euthanasia. Passive euthanasia is "pulling the plug", so to speak. It means removing artificial means for keeping someone alive, or having machinery perform functions that the human body cannot, and taking those machines away. Most churches have decided that since keeping someone "artificially" alive is not really keeping them alive, they should be allowed to have passive euthanasia. Mainly, this is based on cost concerns, that keeping someone artificially alive produces heavy expenses on the remaining family.

However, this also comes down to what we call a question of "artificially" alive. How about radiation treatments, (about as unnatural an occurrence as ever in the evolutionary cycle), drugs, endless vomiting, etc.? As I elaborate in my chapter on Magick, human psychology relates directly to the ability to recover. There may be hope for someone who wants to live, but cytology has told us that someone who wants to die, will die. It is this person's right to die with dignity and in a manner that leaves the immediate family in best psychological and social well-standing. Therefore, active euthanasia is no different, once someone has lost the will to live, anything extra done is just delaying death. They will never recover their health.

Now, let's talk about the moral implications of suicide. For most theists, it is against the rules of God to kill yourself. However, that isn't necessarily true. The Book of Exodus makes it abundantly clear that God controls the "Angel of Death", the implication being the same one given throughout the Old Testament, nobody dies unless God lets them. Thus, if God controls death, then it can't be against God to kill yourself. In fact, on James Dobson's "Focus on the Family", (Or "Focus on the white, bigoted, middle-class, conservative Christian family", as a friend put it), one of his guests converted to Christianity because she couldn't kill herself. An angel of God prevented her from doing it. If we take this one account to be literal, why does it not apply across the board? (This answers most classic Greek and Christian thoughts on suicide).

Kant's objection to suicide was that it goes against free will. The first person to make the "Free will allows suicide" were the Stoics of Roman times. Kant objects that free will cannot and does not exist independant of existence, therefore, to kill yourself kills free will, therefore, suicide goes against free Will. However, free will implies the right to enjoy life, and to live it to the fullest, and it also implies a right to stop living life whenever it is beyond a point where it is bareable. In which case, not commiting suicide goes against free will, as free will is only worth something if it is valued by the party to whom it is even owned by!

Another objection is that many cases of martyrdom, or self-sacrifice, were in effect suicides. Allowing yourself to be killed is essentially the same thing as suicide. The problem with calling martyrdom suicides is that if suicide is a moral sin, then many of the greatest people we admire for their courage, such as men who jump onto a grenade willingly to save their platoon, are actually morally reprehensible. Terence O'Keefe then stated that what made the difference between martyrdom and suicide was intent.

His argument was that if the "true" suicide person was revived, they would ask to be killed again, while effectively, the person who didn't truely want to kill themselves would be overjoyed at being brought back to life. However, this becomes a closed theory. We don't always know what the underlying motives are behind someone who willingly lets themselves die. In the case of Socrates, he could have left, but he felt it was his time to go. Even in the end of his dialogue with his friends and students, he implied that his time had arrived, and he was to meet his destiny, he had lived a full life. If we had revived him, he would have told us to let him go back, and fulfill his destiny.

Other philosophers have gone against suicide in the argument of irrationality. That is to say that no one knows what death even is, therefore, it is irrational to choose it because you cannot weigh it between any other choice. Overall, this line of reasoning stated that death was a false metaphor, (believing in heaven, believing it as eternal sleep, etc.) Ironically though, this again creates a closed-theory, since neither any people arguing for or against death knows what it is, you can't say a "false metaphor", because there isn't any objective standard upon which to even make a metaphor in the first place. If something is already "false", (how many fairies can skate on an ice cube in March?), anything and everything you say about it will be both true and false. Second, life is fleeting, but death is inevitable. Upon this line of argument, what could be more irrational than trying to get rid of the one absolute certainty in life, that you will die? Therefore, in addition to creating what is ultimately a closed-theory, they also leave us to ponder a less-than-rational idea.

The most eloquent defense of the idea of suicide comes to us from Seneca. He writes that "Mere living is not good, but living well." In a more modern updating, let's say we crammed the Earth to its maximum limit of people, 20 billion. If we put 20 billion people on this Earth, plagues, famine, starvation, disease, thirst, etc. would be the average, everyone on Earth would be miserable. We wouldn't even have room to bury our dead, so they would pile up in the streets and rot. Now, if we argue that the quantity of life is better than the quality of life, then the 20 billion people on Earth idea would sound fabulous. Most people, however, retain enough rational senses to know that a good life is better than just having a life.

Thus, Jonathan Glover and Joseph Fletcher both argue that if a life causes more pain to itself, and to others, (i.e. hospital bills to the immediate family), isn't it more rational to terminate that life than to live it? As Fletcher says: "When suicide helps human beings, it is right. That is, we have a right to do it. What makes it right is human need."

In trying to find underlying causes for suicide, the most honest opinion has been expressed by Dr. Karl Menninger, a researcher on suicide:

Life trying to eliminate criminal behaviour, homosexuality, etc., to the easiest and simpest means possible, trying to reduce suicide to the "Lowest common denominator" may well have the same problem. Namely, that trying to find a simple and false justification will not ever address the problem. (I'm only using homosexuality in the same sense as suicide and criminal behaviour because of the old social opinions on it, that it was a manifestation of some gross abnormality.)

Suicide is not always the result of an irrational mind, indeed, many people seem to contemplate it for months and years, hardly an action of a singular abnormality. Some people have written that we should empathize with those who rationally commit suicide, after all, they helped themselves, their family, and their friends, and at their moment of truth when they ended their own personal pain, why should we scorn them for it?

Now that we've addressed, (in brief), suicide, let's address Euthanasia. Again, this comes down to essentially the same argument. Is the quality of life worth more than the quantity of life? Modern medicine comes down a long way, and we now possess the ability to almost infinitely keep people in perpetual limbo. 80 percent of patients who die at hospitals and nursing homes do so because someone, the doctor, nurse, relatives, or even the person themselves, will terminate their life support.

The mere fact that people will willingly terminate their own life-support ought to let us know how enjoyable that is. Let's use a metaphor. Suppose we were to walk into a torture camp, armed and loaded with a gun. A guard was behind us, not allowing us any escape. Should we decide to turn on the guard, he'd shoot us before we could make it. The people in this torture camp would be tortured indefinitely if we don't shoot them, they possessed no escape. The only choice you had was to let them be tortured, or to shoot them. Some of them are saying, "Please... shoot me..." What do you do?

In effect, this is the situation that someone on life support is in, they will not come out of it, and they are being tortured. Most of the greatest torture devices didn't even kill, they allowed the victim to suffer almost indefinitely, such as Chinese torture systems. How much more humane are we really being? Like the abortion debate, even when I've convinced people in the necessity of it, they still didn't agree to it. Likewise, many people might find that though they are unable to actually agree to torture, they will agree to prolonged life, another form of torture.

Even people who were against suicide, where a otherwise healthy person killed themselves, were pro-euthanasia. This changed somewhat dramatically with Hitler, who favored euthanasia. Only instead of mercy killing, he just went around killing, targetting over 250,000 Germans who couldn't work or had been ill for more than five years. Though the distinction between this type of indescriminate murder is much different than classic and modern euthanasia, the ghosts that Hitler left behind still haunt our hallways.

The next problem came from technology. Previously, doctors didn't have any trouble applying the standards of euthanasia, because we couldn't keep patients alive very long who had certain problems. Thus they would kill the person in as painless a manner. Now, with our ability to prolong death by years, (and I'm absolutely convinced this is one of the first societies ever to believe that death is the worse thing that can happen to someone), doctors faced a new problem. Instead of knowing certain people WOULD die anyway, irregardless of what they did, they now found they could prolong almost anyone from dying, though they couldn't cure the person. Doctors were now faced with lawsuit considerations, and moral dilemma's.

This now falls hardest on doctors. What is the job of a doctor? To me, the job of a doctor is NOT to prolong death, (since we all agree it is inevitable anyway), it is to IMPROVE the life of the patient. This is the problem, because those arguing for sanctity-of-life-no-matter-what say that the only job a doctor has is to keep the patient alive, irregardless of whether or not it actually helps the patient. Also the problem comes up that many doctors can't actually kill the patient themselves.

Likewise, if many people were transported back in time to kill Stalin before he could murder millions of people, they still couldn't kill him. (Roughly 85%). Another case is with people who won't murder the people who are holding them hostage, even when given the chance. However, there are special people who could do both jobs, and whether the laymen wants to think about it or not, need to be done. (The infamous "Dr. Death" is one.) This is also substituting a psychological problem with an ethical one.

Many of the anti-euthanasiasts are now moving in ways to make natural death more comfortable. Seemingly, an exercise in futility to me. Why not just end their suffering instead of doing patch-jobs to it? Making natural death more comfortable for those who don't want to die is understandable, but it is against all logic to try and make someone who doesn't want to live and who will die in a horrible manner "forced" to live.

Another approach, similar to the Kant one, is from John Stuart Mill. "The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free." In other words, in a free society, we are not so free as to sell ourselves into slavery. This would, of course, depend upon what we consider slavery, as many people sell themselves to the government after being convicted of a crime in order to escape jail time, they serve in the military. I would, in effect, call this indentured slavery. The euthanasia form of this argument is that we are not so free that we are free to kill ourselves, or to assist someone in doing that.

I can agree with Robert Barry, in that euthanasia is immoral and unethical when it amounts to providing basic cares, such as food and water. However, what about in states of "a persistent vegetative state" where the person is a "passive prisoner of medical technology"? In such states, should the person be taken care of? If the value of life is determined by the experiences, (see the abortion arguments), or if it is determined by those to whom the life is valued, (the person themselves and the friends/family), or if by both, then how can anyone logically say that someone is "alive", when every definition for what is actually living is violated?

James Rachels argues that passive euthanasia and active euthanasia are morally the same, and in effect, active euthanasia is better. Passive euthanasia, or merely neglect, is prolonging the suffering, and in fact, compounding it. Meanwhile, active euthanasia actually ends all pain. Back to the prison camp, it would be as if another option was thrown to us. Now, we may either shoot those suffering, or deny them food and water, while they are still being tortured. They will die quicker than from the suffering alone, yet surely shooting them now must be preferred over letting them starve and thirst themselves to death?

Rachels says that intention is useless in a good act, the reason and effect is what makes it a good act. Either by passive or active euthanasia, the reason is to stop the suffering of the patient because it is useless to not do so. Those arguing that letting mercy kills happen will automatically deginerate it into plain killings are ignoring that though any system may be abused, it is the duty of those in charge to make checks and balances so that does not happen.

Arthur J. Dick and Paul Ramsey argue for the middle road in all of this. We note that a "quality of life" argument is pretty subjective, which leads itself too open to errors because of the degree of subjectivity. Rather, the patient must be dying. A doctor knows the difference between when he is going to kill someone, and when he is helping someone to die. If someone is already dying, then we are to help him to the next ineviteable step, while simulataneously taking care of him/her.

Meanwhile, Paul Ramsey tells us that the primary problem is outdated language. Specifically, we are using terms and definitions dating from the Middle Ages, about problems there is no way any theologian of the Middle Ages could have predicted! Never before in history has this problem been confronted before, should we allow people to suffer or should we end their lives? Instead, we look to something else, whenever someone has stopped receiving curative treatment, that is to say, doctors have abandoned all hope for recovery, the doctors should look on how to help this patient die well. That is to say, to alleviate his suffering as much as possible, but also help him to die when the time comes that he needs it. (I keep saying 'He' but only because him/her, he/she is too bulky).

The people involved in this decision should be the doctor, the family, and the person who is actually involved. When a decision has been made on part of the patient, and the doctor has concluded that there is no further available treatment. It comes down not to terms such as "quality of life", but rather, "Is this person dying or not?" Physicians make the determination on "terminally ill" and "incurable", nobody else does. Also, for example, an anencephalic baby, or one born without a brain. Surprisingly, modern technology has come so far that we can keep a brain-dead baby alive, but for what? Is biological function in this case our definition for living?

In the Hospice movement, they are doing an honorable thing in trying to alleviate the suffering of the dying, though I feel they are lying when they claim they can stop almost all pain. Their claim is that euthanasia is "destroying" the lives of them by making it so that research isn't being done anymore on people who are terminally ill. Yes, since euthanasia came out a few million years ago, research into cancer and AIDS has been so low.... (something like a 100 billion dollar a year industry). Ronald Dwarkin points out that each person has varying standards on "their" life, such as Stephen Hawking, the paralyzed cosmologist. He has managed to accomplish an extraordinairre amount despite his handicap. In a similar position, a professional athlete might have wanted his life to end because he felt it was being wasted.

The debate is caused by the fact that 80% of us who die in hospitals and nursing homes are going to die in a horrible manner, hooked up to a machine. In effect, we're really arguing over our future, thus this issue has a bigger home than many others. In reality, I think one of the fairest ways is to require by law that everyone have a card, sort of like an organ donor's card, that tells if they are wanting to live on artificial means or not. Since this happens to 4 out of 5 people in the hospital, with technology growing all the time, I feel this is an easy way to solve this problem, for the person, the doctors, and the family.

The final piece of Satanic Morality is utilitarian consequentialism, as the weaker philosophical element, while the stronger element is Person-based Consequentalism. Some people might ineviteably think me weak-kneed for not taking a "hard stand" on one system, and instead, choosing to adopt strong/weak points of an argument, but I think this is nonsense. To adopt a "pure" standpoint on something means that it is ipso facto the "way" to do something. In the same manner, the American government is formulated that there is a strong central government, and a weaker state government, which gets weaker as it progresses down the line from nation to state to county to city.

Philosophers with objections to consequentialism state such things as "According to utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on leisure activities such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways which produced a greater social benefit, such as charity work." However, this is an erroneous assumption. We've already stressed that morality is first and foremost something personal, or that it relates to a person to a greater extent than society. Second, we've already seen that we cannot justify an action just because of who it helps. Third, trying to help people all the time without proper rest, relaxation, and time to yourself is detrimental because it takes time away from those you are responsible to, your boss, your children, your wife, yourself. The end result is that you are responsible for yourself first, your immediate relatives second, and society at large third. Fourth, it's physiologically and psychologically impossible to "always" be running around doing good. Fifth, the action is for the betterment of society. No one is hurt by the action, while you are benefited. Robert Ingersoll expresses this idea when he says:

Let's discuss this a little more. The traditional account of consequentialism is that it is of an aggregative form of consequentialism. That is to say that it makes two points. If we come to a point where we have to make a choice between certain alternatives, we take two things into consideration. We figure that with our actions, point A, an alternative decision is better than anothers only if the summation (the"aggregate") of all individuallevels of well-being who exist, or will exist is greater than the summation in other choices. The point B is that the agents of consequentialism ought to choose the best alternative amongst these choices. Thus, the goal of traditional consequentialism, (utilitarian consequentialism), is to make everyone who will exist and does exist more happy.

The biggest objection to this point of consequentialism is called the "Equality problem". Here's how it works. Let's say that I have 100 thousand people. 20,000 make 10,000 dollars yearly, (200,000,000), 70,000 make 40,000 yearly, (2,800,000,000), and 10,000 make 100,000 dollars yearly (1,000,000,000). The end result would be that if I were to take the total amount of wealth, and give it to everyone equally, we'd end up with 40,000 dollars yearly per person. Now, the largest majority of the class would be unaffected, (40,000 dollars to them, the same wages), while the richest class would be greatly affected, (loss of 60,000 dollars yearly). However, going on total volume of happiness, 20,000 people just started making 30,000 dollars more per year. That means that our equation looks like this:

Class	Amount of Money Initially	Amount of Money After	Happiness Ratio:
Average	40,000 dollars yearly	40,000 dollars yearly	0
Below Average	10,000 dollars yearly	40,000 dollars yearly	20,000
Above Average	100,000 dollars yearly	40,000 dollars yearly	- 10,000

That means that the Total Happiness value is + 10,000. Meaning that by pure utilitarian consequentialism, this is a good thing. More people are happy versus unhappy, so the solution should be clear. This is basically inline with Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 407-16, which talks about the "counting principle". That is to say, that we should satisfymaximal sets of desires.

A few lines of objection, however, may be argued. Since the system of capitalism runs on the "Invisible hand of fate", meaning that people are motivated to work because they believe fate will produce them goods in exchange for services offered, this would depriciate that mode of operation. Because of that, no groups would feel compelled to work because they believe that irregardless of whether they work or not, (the welfare argument), they will get paid the same amount of money. Thus, the entire system crashes, and we are left with a negative 100,000 in terms of happiness.

The first and foremost thing for any of this to take place is the ability of a society to think rationally, and of course, in order to think rationally, one must first be taught exactly how that occurs. Thus Satanists believe in teaching classes in ethics, especially with high school and junior colleges. Most critics, (ironically, usually theists), will cite church and state seperation. In reality, what they're scared of is that teenagers and young adults might learn that there are other and better systems of values outside of Christianity. However, ethics is always extraneous to religion, that is to say, ethics can be taught completely apart from religion. Thus there is no conflict of interest here. Socrates knew this, and anyone who has studied religion knows this.

One of the primary examples which Kant talks about is the intent of the action, not just the outcome of that action. As an example, there's a difference between a person who is merely doing their duty, next to one who is doing it because it is their duty. The former case is what Kant considered to be a "good will". For those familiar with the Judaic Christian archetypes and mythos, in the Book of Revelation, there are two judgement thrones. The first one is for the nonbelievers, called the Great Bronze Judgement Throne. The second is for the believers, the Great White Judgement Throne. (Because of the dubious and apocryphal nature of the Book of Revelation, there are several different "interpretations" to what it says, I'm trying to stick to an orthodox one, though the matter is truly of little consequence.)

It is the latter we shall talk about. For the believers, they have their works put on a plate, and their works are either made of straw and hay or they are made of gold and precious stones. Works which are done solely for the purpose of egoism are made of straw and get burned up by the fire. The really great works get turned into a beautiful crown which you give to Jesus. The point here is that it seems to relate that the intent is more important than just the outcome.

However, the words of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (c. 1091-1153), come to mind: "Hell is full of good intentions or desires." That saying was revamped at some point to say, "The road to hell is paved with good intentions".

The Kantian theory basically states that the distinctive and defining features of rational beings is that they cannot be pushed around by forces around them, but that they should be able to act upon thought. When we succumb to emotions, we lose this and become irrational beings, being swayed by our biological forces. The name that Kant gives this is the "conception of laws". A perfectly rational being in the Kantian model will do something simply out of the innate ability to recognize it as good, and will act in this "good" manner without resistence. In effect, because something is good, it is sufficient for action. However, for less-than-perfect rational beings, who are governed by various incentives, fears, prejudices, etc., the fact that something is good or required will not be sufficient reason for them to commence action.

The Kantian argument is that we possess intristic senses of right and wrong, and only through non-rational processes do we act upon those instincts. I do agree that most human beings are rational, in the sense that they can recognize right and wrong. However, in the cases of criminals, they don't. Some do possess rationalizing abilities, but most criminals possess very few intellectual capabilities to know right from wrong.

Kant discusses then that a person must possess a good will. That is to say, there's a difference between a person (merely) doing their duty and their doing it because it is their duty. The value of the action a person performs isn't justifiable by the end product of that action. Basically, an expression of good will, finds its value or worth:

However, I find this to be hogwash. I honestly don't care if the person who cures World Hunger is doing it because they want to get a lifetime of blowjobs, or if the person who blows up the World is trying to save humanity. Intent is necessary because it gives a direction towards which to aspire, but to say that it is merely the thought that counts is not a practical realization of how humanity works. Like another one of Kant's famous maxim's: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Kant argues against consequentialism by stating that you can't know what is going to happen by your actions, so only act upon a certain sect of principles, and whatever happens, well, it happens. Therefore, it's only your intent and acting in accord which matter. I believe this to be an over-simplification to life, however. An objection by Bertrand Russell is useful:

Another illustration may be found in Dostoyevsky's novel, "Crime and Punishment". Raskolnikov kills an old woman so that he can distribute her money to the poor. Was the principle causing him to act a good one? Perhaps. However, there must a fine level of contention on the actual results.

One of the things I liked about Anton Lavey was that he was very critical of the past. He warned about looking back at your life with those rose-stained glasses. Almost everyone believes that the days of old were the great days. Every generation is warned how vile and perverse they are to the next one. Lucretius tells us that nature has degenerated (lib. II. v. 1159). The comparison in antiquity is always to greater days of antiquity, which of course, were better. Horace responds to this in a letter to Augustus (Epist. I. liv. ii.).

This strikes me as an irony because you listen to feminists whine about those "grand and great" days of matriarchal bliss. It's interesting to hear people comment about places they never were in; in times that they've never been. Interestingly, there's a very popular Samurai book called "Hagakure". The book was written by younger Samurai's listening to the stories of an old Samurai, who they thought had really cool stories. He'd ramble and rant from time to time, but mostly, he was interesting. The reoccuring theme of his stories was in "kokutai" or "National unity" amongst the Japanese.

However, there's a problem. The Japanese man who wrote Hagakure, (or the young Samurai who remembered the stories of the old Samurai), was not a Samurai, or at least not in the strict sense of the word. He was a beaurocrat who dreamed of being a hero one day, and his goal was to commit junshi to follow his master into the afterlife. It wasn't possible for him to do so, (it was illegal), so he became sort of a crackpot old man. By the time the author of Hagakure was around, the feudal days of Japan had long passed by about 200 years, and it was peaceful and quiet in the land of Japan. So he rants about what is wrong with the World today and young Samurai's, but the historical value of the book is to be taken with a grain of salt. He too liked to talk about the good-old days he never was involved in. Remember that whenever you hear a story about them "good old days". In the realm of ethics, you'll probably hear this most often when you start thinking about them "Good old days" when the ten commandments were in every school, and everyone knew how to behave morally, ad infinitum. (To see this kind of thinking, get Paul Jersild's "Making Moral Decisions: A Christian Approach to Personal and Social Ethics").

What's the difference between self-esteem and self-respect? I've already mentioned that criminals almost always possess high opinions of themselves, but it's very brittle. The reason why is they have high self-esteem, but no self-respect. Self-esteem is just a fluctuation of how you feel at that moment. It's as fickle as any other human emotion such as contentment, love, joy, sadness, etc. Without any sort of external agent upon which these feelings manifest, they are all meaningless.

Let's look at one criminal. He was a violent man, arrested for beating a McDonald's worker after the man refused to cook the eggs over. The reason? He felt it was disrespectful that the man wasn't going to cook the eggs again, and that hurt his self-esteem. He felt that by beating the man, he would gain it back. That's the criminal mentality. They feel great until someone challenges their authority. The famous Ice-man beat a man in a line waiting for a movie because the man wouldn't let him cut in front of him. Because they have no real system of interpretation for referencing respect or worth, any floating value will make them feel violent. No one likes having low self-esteem, and they are willing to do whatever it takes to return their feeling of self-esteem.

Self-respect is a bit different. Self-respect is being proud of your accomplishments and what you've done. It's having faith in something externalized, which no one can take from you. In this sense, it is a more concrete thing than love, because what do we often hear when two people are in love? "I love the way he/she makes me feel." That's fine and well, but what happens when they leave? Since self-respect is something that comes from within, and what you have done, and not other people, there won't be a need for endless posturing and proselytizing. Because of a need not for self-esteem, but for self-respect, Satanism believes that you should try to do the best you can, and be proud of these efforts.

In Ben Stein's book "Bunkhouse Logic", he says, "To be happy, one must be happy with oneself. In real life that comes from accomplishments of which one can be proud.... even a small measure of real-life accomplishment is a far stronger benefit to the soul than any number of hours of whining in a room lined with bookcases, modern art, and diplomas."

Carl Gustav Jung argued that a person is born with both good and evil personalities that are gradually differentiated from one another as he/she develops. Usually, a person will unconsciously repress the evil side, creating a negative "shadow" in the unconscious mind. If the repression mechanisms overpower an individual, the shadow can explode without warning, thereby leading to destructive, evil acts. On the other hand, healthy individuals will integrate their good and evil sides on a conscious level. Therefore, evil can be controlled only when it is consciously understood and integrated.

Despite the realization that evil can come from within, many people perceive evil as coming from an external source. The primary purpose of this conceptional idea is that it lends itself onto casting imaginary projections onto a corporeal thing. We are constantly bombarded with people saying, "The devil made me do it; society is to blame; my mother is to blame", blah blah blah. "Get rid of the television and the cd's, and people will be non-violent!" Wait, people were sacrificing other people to gods long before the remote and television came into play, and the ever loving Vlad the Impaler was committing a rather wide variety of atrocities long before we ever looked at our first movie. It is amazing that as much as we know about society, we still wish to press our own fears and imaginations of the ethereal onto quantifiable sources. This viewpoint leads itself towards fear, and fear is the parent to cruelty. We must get rid of these things if we ever wish to press forward as either a culture, religion, or species. These false beliefs in Demons and Devils are just the personification of our own internal imagination on a conscious level.

The hardest part about accepting this fact is that it requires an introverted perspective, an inward realization that is somewhat time consuming, and moreover, painful. We are constantly taught through our own emotions and experiences, to those of others, to "pass the buck" along in the guilt and blame line. The idea of actually taking responsibility for our own actions seems to be a dismal and counterproductive notion. Yet, this is what we find when we turn the eye inward and start reflecting upon what we are really doing. If you achieve success, God and the Devil have little to do with it.